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Our jury has had its opponents ever since its
inception, but it is only within the last decade that
this opposition has reached what one might call the
activist level. The first major dent came in 1970 with
Williams v. Florida which stripped the 12-member
jury of its constitutional protection by declaring
6-member juries constitutional, and for that matter
smaller juries, too. A sequel came this last term,
when the Supreme Court dispensed with the una-
nimity requirement. Two traditional properties of
the jury were thereby stripped of their constitutional
protection-at least in state criminal trials-and
both these moves were based on the premise that
these properties are of little significance. A mo-




What Difference Do They Make?
By Hans Zeisel*
I
The Court in Williams v. Honda quite correctly
emphasized community representation as an essen-
tial ingredient of our juries. By now, we know that in
the crucial twenty percent of all jury trials in which
the jury's verdict differs from what the presiding
judge would have done, it is precisely the injection
of the community's sense of justice which makes the
jury verdict what it is. We also know, that in most
every jury deliberation, something like an early first
ballot takes place. Only about one-third of these first
ballots are unanimous, the other two-thirds are split,
some jurors voting for conviction, others for acquit-
tal, and some jurors not yet committed. This, in spite
of the fact that all jurors in a case have seen and
heard the very same evidence, the same lawyers,
and the same judge. This means that jurors perceive
and evaluate the evidence differently, which should
not surprise us. If jurors would never differ in their
perception and evaluation, there would be no need
to have ever more than one juror. But since in the
real world jurors do differ, we are wise to have
several of them.
The question is how, if at all, reducing their num-
ber from twelve to six will affect the verdicts. We
might begin by conceiving of the jury as a sample
from the eligible adult population, something like a
Gallup Poll. Everybody knows that 12 jurors cannot
really represent the whole community; but however
*This paper is based upon a presentation made by Hans
Zeisel, Professor of Law and Sociology, The University of
Chicago, at the July 1972 Conference of the Ninth judicial
Circuit.
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poorly they do it, 6 jurors do it less well. An example
will make this clear. Think of a ten percent minority
in the population. You might think of the blacks, but
you might also think, for instance, of people who are
more tolerant toward deviant sexual behavior, or of
people particularly incensed about the use of drugs.
You then ask yourself: what are the chances in a
random selection of jurors from this population, of
having at least one member of this 10 percent minor-
ity on the jury? Simple calculus reveals that, on the
average, 72 out of 100 randomly selected 12-member
juries will have at least one such minority member.
But among 100 juries of 6-members, only 47 will
have such a minority representative. Hence, less
frequent representation of minorities on our juries
is one inevitable result of cutting down their size
from 12 to 6.
A second result of this reduction in size is an in-
crease in the gamble which litigants or defendants
take in going before a jury: reduction of their size
will reduce the predictability of jury verdicts. It will
help if we think of the jury decision in personal injury
cases, which form the bulk of the business that
comes before our civil juries. In these cases, the
individual jurors' differences in perception and
evaluation express themselves in different ideas of
what constitutes negligence, of how much an injury
hurts, and of what an injury is worth. And we know
that the final verdict in a case will be somewhere in
the middle, some kind of average, of these different
evaluations of the individual jurors.
An elementary statistical calculation again re-
veals that these averages of juror evaluations in
comparable cases will fluctuate more in 6-member
juries than they do in 12-member juries. To be pre-
cise, they will fluctuate by 41 percent more than the
average evaluations of 12-member juries.* Again,
the analogy with the Gallup Poll will help. We know
that the smaller the size of a sample, the greater
will be its margin of error. And here again we learn
* Vi2- 1 = .41
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from calculus that reducing the sample size by one.
half (e.g., from 1500 to 750-but also from 12 to 6)
will Increase the margin of error by some 41 percent.
Translated into our jury problem, "margin of error"
means wider fluctuations, reduced predictability-
greater gamble.
Third, the 6-member juries produce fewer hung
juries. From what we know about how hung juries
develop, we should expect this result, and figures
from the Miami, Florida, criminal court confirm this
expectation. There the proportion of hung juries-
Florida tries its felonies before 6-member juries-is
two and a half percent, compared to five percent for
the states using 12-member juries. One should have
expected this result on two grounds. Think again of
the hypothetical 10 percent minority in the popula-
tion, only this time assume it is a minority of
"stubborn dissenters." We know already that 6-
member juries, on the average, will have such a
dissenter only on 47 out of every 100 juries, com-
pared to 72 out of 100 12-member juries. Thus on
this ground alone, we should expect the 6-member
jury to have but two-thirds as many hung juries as
the 12-member jury. This difference is enhanced by
a second element. Hung juries are hardly ever the
result of one lone juror holding out from the begin-
ning of the deliberation to its end. Normally, the
hung jury develops from a sizable minority that
keeps shrinking until one or two jurors decide to
hang. A single, lone juror has not the strength of
holding out unless he had, at the outset, some broth-
ers with hin in his dissent. And since there is a
greater probability that "more than one stubborn
dissenter" is being found on a 12-member jury than
on a 6-member jury, the larger jury will convert
more initial disagreements into hung juries than the
smaller jury.
In Williams v. Florida, we were consoled by dicta
that no evil could come from this reduction in the
number of jurors as long as we have unanimous ver-
dicts. But then it took but a short while before una-
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nimity went by the boards. In Johnson v. Louisiana
and Apodaco v. Oregon, the Court allowed Louisiana
to continue its 9 to 3 verdicts in major crimes, and
Oregon its 10 to 2 verdicts. Unanimity was no longer
a constitutionally protected element of the trial
by jury.
In Louisiana, where 9 jurors can simply outvote
the other 3, at least four representatives of a dis-
senting minority are needed before the majority is
forced to talk to them. In the instant case before the
Court, the deliberation had lasted only 41 minutes
which, as anyone knows, is about the bare minimum
for a polite jury to come back after a decisive first
ballot; jurors do not want to appear as not having
properly discussed the case, even if in fact they
had not.
Justice White said the minority on a jury will al-
ways argue Its position and if it has anything to say,
its view will be accepted; if It has nothing to say, it
deserves to be rejected. The Court here fails to
reckon with the realities of the deliberation process.
A juror may be articulate with respect to his clear
notion as to what in justice, the verdict should be;
but he is not necessarily an eloquent advocate able
to argue his position well.
In Johnson v. Louisiana, the Court had a particu-
larly difficult hurdle to overcome, because the de-
fendant claimed to have committed a lesser crime,
classified only as misdemeanor. In Louisiana, a
misdemeanor is to be tried before a 5-member jury
whose verdict, however, must be unanimous. The
defendant claimed that he had a better chance of
escaping conviction before such a jury than before
a 12-member jury, of which only 9 jurors had to
agree on a verdict. The Court gave short shrift to
this claim, branding it simply as a challenge of the
"judgment of the Louisiana Legislature." Maybe
that is what it was, but the substance of the chal-
lenge had merit. Again, simple calculus shows that
the chances for effective dissent are greater on the
5-member unanimous jury: it is far more probable to
find one member of a 10-percent population minority
on a 5-member jury, than to find four such minority
persons on a 12-member jury.
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The Court, in these two cases, admitted that
majority verdicts reduce the number of hung juries;
there are good statistics from Oregon proving the
point. But the Court was not bothered, because it
expected the ratio between acquittals and convic-
tions to be unaffected. Even if this expectation were
correct, the defendant who under the unanimity
rule would have had a hung jury but is convicted
under the new rule, will find little consolation in the
assurance that there is likely to be a balancing case
in which a defendant who would have had a hung
jury is now acquitted by a majority vote.
There is an amusing historical footnote to the
Court's view that majority verdicts will not result in
more convictions. In the eighteen-twenties, the
French jury was composed of 12 members, and the
defendant stood convicted if a majority of jurors
found him guilty, otherwise he was acquitted. But if
the number of guilty votes was just the bare majority
of seven, the presiding colleglum of judges could set
the verdict aside and acquit the defendant. No such
intervention was possible if the number of guilty
votes was 8 or more. In 1830, the law was changed,
requiring henceforth at least 8- guilty votes and re-
moving thereby also the possible intervention by the
tribunal. At that time, the great mathematician
Poisson, a student of the performance of juries, was
able to trace accurately by how much this slight
increase in the required number of guilty votes
would reduce the number of convictions. Yet the
United States Supreme Court, one-hundred-fifty
years later thought the much broader jump from
unanimity to a 9-to-3 majority would make no
difference.
M
Williams was a state criminal case. But there was
a clear indication that the six-man jury would be
deemed permissible in federal criminal cases. The
interesting question was whether the six-man jury
would be permissible in federal civil cases, for there
the Court had to cope with the language of the
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Seventh Amendment. In footnote 30 of Williams the
Court stated:
... while much of our discussion in this case
may be thought to bear equally on the Inter-
pretation of the Seventh Amendment's jury
trial provisions, we emphasize that the
question is not before us we do not decide
whether, for example, additional references
to the 'common law' that occur in the Seventh
Amendment might support a different inter-
pretation.
After this statement, it was fair to assume further
Supreme Court adjudication of the issue. But the
Judicial Conference of the United States could not
wait, and in March 1971 passed the following
resolution:
Be it resolved... That... the Conference ap-
prove in principle a reduction in the size of
juries in civil trials in United States district
courts, and upon such reduction that there be
a diminution in the peremptory challenges
normally allowed. It is also resolved that the
means to effectuate the objectives set forth in
this resolution, i.e., by rulemaking [emph.
added] or statute, be referred to the Commit-
tees on Civil Rules and on the Operation of the
Jury System.
One wonders from where the Judicial Conference
obtained the power to effectuate the change in this
manner, in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 48, which explicitly
assumes a 12-man jury, and of 28 U.S.C. § 1870.
which guarantees three peremptory challenges to
each side. These doubts have not been shared by
the local district courts. Today, a majority of the
district courts have extended Williams by local rule-
making to federal civil cases.
Will Apodaca be so extended? I do not think so.
Once again, Apodaca involved a state criminal case,
but in this instance the Court was more closely
divided; only four Justices joined Justice White's
opinion. Justice Powell, the fifth Justice needed to
eliminate the unanimity requirement in state crimi-
nal cases, made it clear that he would not subscribe
to the Apodaca rule in federal criminal cases. In
those cases he would insist on unanimity. But exten-
sion to the Federal Courts would add only a small
fraction to the cases now under the Apodaca rule,
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since the overwhelming bulk of all criminal cases
goes through the state courts. And, indeed, juries
that combine both the less-than-twelve and the non-
unanimity feature are not far off. The legislatures of
several of our states are teeming with such pro-
posals, and in one remote corner of our law, such a
jury already exists, namely the military court-
martial jury.
You might remember the jury that tried Lieutenant
Calley; there, four jurors out of six were allowed to
render a verdict. I do not know the author of the
court-martial statute, but I wonder he did not intend
to design a jury that reduced to a minimum the abil-
ity of a dissenting minority to fail the will of the
majority. It is perhaps significant in this context,
that by a strange rule, found nowhere else in the
American law, the exact vote of these court-martial
jurors remains secret. This is how the Calley verdict
was announced: "The jury, in the presence of six
jurors found..." To this day, we do not know
whether or not the verdict was unanimous.
It is only fair to report that in Johnson v. Louisiana
and Apodoca v. Oregon, the Court's mind was not
entirely at ease. Justice Blackmun felt constrained
to note that he supported the Court's view as long as
it allowed a majority verdict of 9 out of 12 jurors; he
would hesitate to allow a 7-to-5 majority (he skipped
the 8-to-4 possibility). Justice Powell consoled us
with a safeguard-the cross-section character of
juries, protected by the wide availability of peremp-
tory challenges. But as you know, that safeguard is
not very safe either; moves are abroad to cut down
the number of peremptory challenges.
It is by no means certain that the Court meant
these decisions to be steps in the erosion of the jury.
The jury's extension at the lower end of the spec-
trum in Duncan v. Louisiana points in a different
direction. But effects are sometimes unintended.
Ever smaller juries, because they are less homoge-
nous, will make verdicts more erratic, and it is just
possible that the ever smaller majorities will make
jury verdicts more conforming to what the judges
would do. Under the impact of both these changes,
the jury could wilt away, simply because there
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